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The paper by Andres Aradillas-Lopez and Elie Tamer claries how identication can be
obtained in games and provides techniques to do so. In other words, it o¤ers constructive ways
of analyzing either point or set identication of parameters governing the preferences and beliefs
of players in di¤erent games. In this short comment, I am trying to highlight the key issues that
are brought out by the paper.
First, as sometimes alluded to by the authors, one way of reading their results is to recognize
that concepts of Nash equilibrium or Bayesian Nash equilibrium lead to xed point equations.
It is then a quite natural consequence to use iterations to arrive at equilibrium since xed point
problems are usually solved by an appeal to a contraction argument and by iterating an innite
number of times the xed point equation (Rust, Traub and Wozniakowski, 2002). This iteration
technique sets two kinds of questions. It poses the question of the interpretation of the iterations
and also the question of the uniqueness of solutions.
Iterations may have structural interpretation. For instance in dynamic choice models, they
are viewed as the steps in a real or mental process of backward induction by a decision maker and,
in this paper, a nice interpretation of "levels of rationality" can be attached to the iterations.
Iterations need not have structural interpretation. The convergence to a stable equilibrium in a
simple demand and supply set up, using a cobweb iteration technique, might not be structural.
A standing question remains about the gain of having a structural interpretation for iterations.
The question of uniqueness of equilibrium is very well described by the three examples worked
out in the paper. The rst example is the simplest because we arrive at equilibrium after one step.
The second example is more sophisticated because we need an innite number of steps before
converging to the equilibrium if the equilibrium is unique. If it is not unique, the limit set is larger
than the set of equilibria. The last example in rst-price auctions is more involved since we cannot
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have convergence to the equilibrium by following Battigalli & Siniscalchi in their construction
of iterations. Multiplicity of solutions is thus a more severe issue than what is obtained under
equilibrium assumptions and the approximation of the strength that an equilibrium hypothesis
is providing, by a set of iterations, is less clear.
A second way of reading the paper is to look at the relationship, investigated by the authors,
between the set of rationalizable strategies and the set of structural parameters (a set which can
be a singleton). The tools that the authors are using, are coming from the literature dealing
with set identication, to which Elie Tamer has contributed a lot (e.g. Tamer, 2003 and Honoré
and Tamer, 2006). The formal exercise of writing down the transformation between the space
of strategies and the space of parameters is not unied in the paper yet. To clarify the issue
(without taking much care with what these spaces are), I am trying to discuss it more formally
now.
Let us rst look at the example of a single decision maker. A standard structural model
would say that the decision, say y; is a function of observed and exogenous characteristics, say
x; of unobserved characteristics, " and of a nite dimensional parameter :
y = d(x; "; ): (1)
Semiparametric identication consists in characterizing the binary relationship between the re-
duced form given by the probability distribution, P (y j x); and the structural form, given by the
parameter  = (; F"(: j x)) where F"(: j x) is the distribution of ": The former characterization
of the data, P (y j x) = P;d(y j x); is induced by the latter structural parameter  and the
structural equation (1) . The reduced form may respectively have none, one or many images
in the space of structural parameters, in which case we say that parameters respectively are
overidentied, point-identied or set-identied. Examples of the last instance are not frequent
albeit not uncommon. Multicolinearity in linear models or measurement error models (Leamer,
1987) provide such instances.
When there are two decision makers, such as in a game, the previous setting applies without
modication only if the economic model d(:) in equation (1) remains a function. It su¢ ces to
reinterpret y as applying to decisions for both, or all, players. What changes in the games studied
by Aradillas Lopez and Tamer is that the structural model delivers structural correspondences
instead of functions. We now have that:
Y = d(x; "; ): (2)
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where Y is a set. For instance, in Example 1 using Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies, the
"central square" of the (t1; t2) space (the authors ") yields all solutions, (0; 0); (0; 1); (1; 0)
and (1; 1). Other examples that the authors study, can be framed like that, either using an
equilibrium concept or a rationalizability one.
The formal discussion may help to derive some general results. For instance, the structural
assumption of level k rationality is weaker than the corresponding one at level k + 1 so that
correspondences at levels k and k + 1 satisfy inclusion properties Yk  Yk+1: As a consequence,
identied sets under successive levels of rationality might be shown to satisfy the same relation-
ship.
Besides, dening the structural model as a correspondence shows that an aspect of what
the authors are proposing is not specic to games. Return to the single decision maker case
by considering identication in dynamic discrete choice models (Magnac and Thesmar, 2002)
where we might have a correspondence instead of a function. Probabilities of future events,
anticipated by the decision maker, could be ambiguous, for instance, because they satisfy in-
equality restrictions instead of being point identied. The imaginative setting of Aradillas Lopez
and Tamer can be extended to these general frameworks to analyze set identication in these
models. Furthermore, dealing with equation (2) where Y is a set, is the objective of a recent
thoughtful paper by Galichon and Henry (2006) whose results could then be used to establish
asymptotic properties of estimators.
Nevertheless, the additional twist with games is related to the standing question in the lit-
erature about dynamic choices about the separate identication of preferences and expectations
(Manski, 2004). What is interesting in games is that beliefs are a function of preferences and
beliefs held by the other agents so that they are intertwined. It is this property that is used in
the paper since rationalizability delivers constraints on beliefs. It would not be the case with
single decision maker models.
Another useful question for applied researchers is to clarify which normalizations of the para-
meters are needed and what is the space of parameters where we can hope to get identication.
The di¤erence between a normalization and an identifying restriction might not be clear at rst
sight. A possible denition would be that normalizations do not a¤ect the family of probability
distributions in spite of a reduction in the parameter space. As before, let  2 ; the parameter
space. A normalization would be dened formally as: For any  2 ; there exists 0 2 0 where
0  ; the inclusion being strict, such that Pr(y j x; ) = Pr(y j x; 0) almost everywhere
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(y; x).
For instance, in the simple game with complete information, is the assumption about the
discrete nature of the distribution function of (t1; t2) a normalization? and how should this
function be normalized? This case is simple because we can summarize the problem by the
probability weights of the nine regions of the parameter space which are dened as lying below
or above, 0 or the parameters . We thus need only 8 numbers to describe the problem so
that, as 1 and 2 are the structural parameters of interest, we just need 6 probabilities. This is
obtained by normalization, that is, there exists a transformation of the parameter space in a way
that can be written as a function of 6 numbers and 1, 2. I believe that it is a question to be
solved before running the linear program (3.1) that is proposed by the authors, lest complications
might arise. The same remark applies to the other examples in the paper where normalization
and identication assumptions might be distinguished more clearly.
There are also more specic questions. Some index restrictions are used although we do not
understand immediately their necessity. More deeply, the rôle of unobserved heterogeneity in
beliefs and the common prior assumption is clearly high on the research agenda and the paper
makes useful steps towards stating su¢ cient conditions.
In conclusion, this is a nice paper because it sets up more questions than it solves although
it solves many. It is certainly a very nice research agenda that the authors are proposing to
anybody working in this eld.
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